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Comments
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS-AN EXAMINATION OF ATTEMPTS




N THE LAST decade there has been a marked increase in the
number of corporate acquisitions and mergers. As a result of
this phenomenon, the legal rights and obligations stemming from
the acquisition of one corporation by another are being contested,
not only by parties who have a direct interest in the acquisition1
but also by those whose interest in the acquisition arises years
after the event.' An injury caused by the use of a product manu-
factured by the acquired corporation often does not occur until
years after the acquisition has taken place3 In such a case, the
injured party frequently discovers that the manufacturer is no
longer in existence due to the acquisition. In addition, during the
intervening years the old corporation's board of directors and
shareholders will have scattered. Thus the plaintiff is left without
an effective remedy against the original corporation,' its former
1 Parties who have a direct interest in the acquisition include creditors and
minority shareholders of the selling corporation. See Manning, The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962) [here-
inafter cited as Manning].
2 An example of a party whose interest in the acquisition might not arise
until years after the transaction is a products liability plaintiff. See Henn & Alex-
ander, Effects of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56 CORNELL
L. REv. 865 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Henn & Alexander].
3 See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Shane v.
Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,
109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480,
288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
4 See McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super.
Ct. 1970), afl'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 388 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
The plaintiff's recovery from the selling corporation may also be barred by
the running of the applicable statute of limitations or by the expiration of the
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directors or its former shareholders. Lacking such a remedy, the
injured plaintiff must attempt to recover from the acquiring cor-
poration. Depending upon the method in which the acquisition
was made, however, the injured plaintiff may find that in addition
to having no means to sue the original corporation, its former
directors or its former shareholders, he also has no remedy against
the acquiring corporation."
To provide the injured plaintiff with a remedy, the courts of
various jurisdictions have created equitable doctrines. One such
doctrine is the "de facto merger" doctrine.' This doctrine pro-
vides the plaintiff with a remedy against the acquiring corpora-
tion even though the acquiring corporation may have expressly
denied any assumption' of the target corporation's contingent lia-
bilities at the time of acquisition To counter this doctrine and
to protect the acquiring corporation, at least one state legislature
has enacted a statute which precludes the application of the de
time allowed by the postponed abatement statutes in effect in all jurisdictions.
Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect
of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims,
41 Mo. L. REv. 321, 327-35 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wallach].
"See Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Shane
v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co.,
288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
'See generally, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston
Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Applestein v. United Board & Carton
Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), afl'd, 33 N.J.
72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960); Deutsch, The Form and Substance of a Merger: A
Reading of Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 20 VILL. L. REv. 80 (1974); Winthrop,
Structuring a Corporate Acquisition to Avoid the De Facto Merger Doctrine,
6 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Winthrop]; Comment, Assump-
tion of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REv. 86 (1975);
Note, Products Liability-Corporate Transaction Structured as a Sale of Assets
Treated as De Facto Merger so as to Hold Transferee Corporation Accountable
For Products Liability Claim Against Dissolved Transferor, 6 SETON HALL L.
REv. 477 (1975).
Traditionally, corporate law has provided that in a purchase of assets trans-
action, a corporation may expressly deny in the sales contract the assumption of
those liabilities it does not intend to assume. See McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,
109 N.J. Super. 555, 563, 264 A.2d 98, 102 (1970), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480,
288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972); 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAw oF' CORPORATIONS § 7122 (perm. rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 15
W. FLETCHER].
'See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
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facto merger doctrine.!
This comment discusses the various types of acquisitions that
may occur. Its focus will then shift to the various judicial attempts
to hold the acquiring corporation accountable for the liabilities
of the acquired corporation when the strict procedural steps for
a merger or consolidation have not been followed. Two innovative
attempts, one legislative" and one judicial,1' to resolve questions
of corporate liability arising from acquisitions will be discussed.
Finally, the potential impact of these two approaches and their
scope and merit will be analyzed.
I. THE VARIOUS METHODS OF CORPORATE ACQUISITION
There are three basic methods to effect corporate acquisitions:1"
(1) the statutory merger or consolidation of two corporations;13
(2) the use by an acquiring corporation of cash or its own stock
to acquire the stock of the target corporation; or (3) the use
by an acquiring corporation of cash or its own stock to acquire
the assets of the target corporation.'
Mergers and consolidations are creations of state laws." Both
a merger and a consolidation result in the transfer of all of a
corporation's assets in exchange for stock. A merger involves the
absorption of one corporation by another corporation." This re-
sults in the continuance of the absorbing corporation and the dis-
solution of the absorbed entity. A consolidation is distinguished
'See TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10.B (Vernon Supp. 1980).
10 Id.
"See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3
(1977).
"1For a general discussion of methods of corporate acquisitions, see C.
SCHARF, TECHNIQUES FOR BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES (1964).
3 See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 65-70 (rev. ed. 1976).
'" These three methods of acquisition or merger are commonly referred to
as "A," "B" and "C" transactions because of their correlation to three provisions
of Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. SS 368(a)(1)(A),
368(a)(1)(B), 368(a)(1)(C), as amended. See B. BrrrKER & I. EUSTICE, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 14 (4th ed.
1979) (tax consequences of corporate reorganizations) [hereinafter cited as
B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE]; Freling, Tax Consequences of Nontax Motivated
Aspects and Factors in the Sale of a Corporate Business, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON
FED. TAX. 1107 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Freling].
I See note 13 supra.
16 See Winthrop, supra note 6, at 195.
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from a merger in that a consolidation results in the formation of
a new corporate entity and the dissolution of the two original
corporations."' Common characteristics of consolidations and mer-
gers are the continuing interest of the absorbed corporation's(s')
shareholders in the newer surviving corporation and the general
assumption of the liabilities of the absorbed corporation by the
survivor(s)."
The acquisition of a corporation by the exchange of the acquir-
ing corporation's stock for the stock of the target corporation"9
results in the continued existence of the target corporation. Since
the target corporation continues its existence 0 it retains its lia-
bilities, even though there has been a change in ownership. The
acquiring corporation is subject to the liabilities of the target
corporation to the extent of its (the acquirer's) ownership interest.'
One reason for the recent increase in the number of acquisi-
tions of this type2 is that world and national economic conditions
in the past few years have kept the stock market stagnant.' As a
result, the stock of small and intermediate companies which have
enjoyed a consistent series of profitable years does not reflect the
strong financial condition of the companies."* The book value per
share' of stock often exceeds the market price of the share."M
"Ild. See Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1932).
18 Due to the similarities between mergers and consolidations, they are treated
in substantially the same manner for purposes of corporate law and taxation.
See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 14, at ch. 14, § 12.
18 This is often referred to as a "B" type transaction. See note 15 and accom-
panying text supra. See B. BITTIER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 14, at ch. 14, § 13.
0"H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS, ch. 19 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as H. BALLANTINE]; N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, ch. 11 (2d
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as N. LATTIN].
21 Id. Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distribution
of Shares, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 349 (1931). See note 14 supra.
2 See 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at ch. 61.
23 This has been particularly true of the New York Stock Exchange. See
FORBES, Feb. 18, 1980, at 40.
2 See id. at 119.
"The determination of the book value per share is a two step process. First,
the net liabilities of the company are substracted from its net assets. Book value
is then determined by dividing the figure which remains by the total number of
outstanding shares.
28 See FORBES, Nov. 12, 1979, at 203.
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When such a situation occurs, the company often becomes a prime
prospect for a takeover.' A corporation may acquire the target
company by purchasing its stock at a cost substantially less than
the value of the target's assets.' The end result is that the acquir-
ing corporation gains control of another corporation at a cost
considerably below that necessary to acquire the same corporation
through the purchase of its asset? or the purchase of similar assets
on the open market.
One of the major drawbacks of acquisitions carried out in this
manner" is that the liability of the acquired corporation generally
carries over to the acquiring corporation. As a general rule, the
surviving corporation in a merger or consolidation assumes the
liabilities of the acquired corporation by operation of law.31 Thus
a transaction which transfers the entire ownership interest in a
corporate entity will result in the transfer of that entity's liability.
In contrast, a transaction which transfers an interest severed from
the ownership interest in a corporation usually will not result in
the transfer of the entity's liabilities." The liabilities of the defunct
corporation, once assumed, include both liabilities that are known
at the time of the transaction, such as those of identifiable creditors,
as well as unknown contingent liabilities to unidentifiable persons,
such as potential products, liability plaintiffs.'
Even though it may cost more financially for an acquiring cor-
poration to exchange its stock for the assets of another corpora-
tion ' than to exchange for the target corporation's stock, there
are advantages that often outweigh the added cost. The primary
advantage is that the purchaser does not assume the seller's lia-
27 Id. at 224.
28 Id. at 229.
29 Id.
10 This is generally referred to as a "B" type merger. See note 14 and accom-
panying text supra. See Stephan, Acquisition Trouble Spots, 21 Bus. LAw. 401,
410 (1966).
31 See Comment, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions,
55 B.U.L. Rav. 86, 91 (1975).
3Id. See Freling, supra note 14, at 1130-31.
'For a discussion of the assumption of contingent liabilities in corporate
acquisitions see Stephan, Acquisition Trouble Spots, 21 Bus. LAw. 401 (1966).
34See note 14 supra, and accompanying text. This is generally referred to as
a "C" type reorganization.
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bilities.' This is in contrast to a merger, consolidation or sale of
stock where, as a matter of corporate law, liability attaches to
the successor corporation. When a corporation buys the assets of
another corporation it is permitted to select those liabilities it
wishes to assume and to exclude from the purchase those express
and unknown liabilities it does not wish to assume. This is based
on the theory that the purchase of the assets of a corporation is
in reality only a purchase of property.' Property law provides that
a bona fide purchaser who has given adequate consideration and
who has no notice of prior claims against the property will not be
liable for any unknown claims.' As a consequence of this rule of
law, the exchange of an acquiring corporation's stock for the
assets of the target corporation is often more appealing than an
exchange for the stock of the target corporation despite the higher
cost involved.
When the target corporation receives stock of the acquiring
corporation in exchange for all of its assets, the target often dis-
tributes this stock to its shareholders and then the target corpora-
tion liquidates." If the acquiring corporation has not assumed all
of the liabilities of the target corporation, including its contingent
liabilities,' and the target has dissolved, creditors and potential
products liability plaintiffs are left without a defendant."0 Various
I Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1935); West Tex. Ref. & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d
77, 81 (10th Cir. 1933); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971); 15 W.
FLETCHER, supra note 7, at S 7122; N. LATTIN, supra note 20; Hills, Consolida-
tion of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distribution of Shares, 19 CALIF. L.
REV. 349 (1931).
'See Comment, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions,
55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 93 (1975).
3'J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 178-79, 221-24 (1962).
'See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CoRPORATIONS § 381
(2d ed. 1970); E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS (1973); N.
LATrnN, supra note 20, at § 184; W. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at § 8224. See
also B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 14, at chs. 7 & 9 (tax consequences
of distribution to shareholders).
I Contingent liabilities include unknown or contingent rights of unidentifiable
persons, such as potential products liability plaintiffs. See generally Freling,
supra note 14, at 1130-36 (contingent liabilities in corporate acquisitions).
10 The possibility that a plaintiff will be unable to find a defendant to sue
increases as the length of time after the transaction increases. See Wallach, supra
note 4, at 323-35.
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remedies created by the legislatures and courts do exist, however,
to provide the creditor or products liability claimant with a defend-
ant and a remedy.' The early development of corporate law in
this area focused on providing the plaintiff with a remedy against
the dissolved corporation. ' However, the emphasis of modem cor-
porate law has shifted to focus on providing a remedy against the
surviving corporation." Due to the onslaught of this effort to hold
the purchasing corporation responsible for the liabilities of the
seller, both the Texas legislature" and the California judiciary
have lashed back to protect the surviving corporation from assum-
ing, without its consent, express or contingent liabilities which it
did not create.
II. CLAIMS AGAINST THE DISSOLVED CORPORATION
AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS
At common law, the power of a corporation to sue and be sued
ended at the time the corporation legally dissolved.' To alleviate
this harsh rule, the courts developed the "trust fund" doctrine to
provide a remedy for plaintiffs where the corporation had dis-
solved."
In the typical corporate dissolution the assets of the corpora-
tion are sold to a third party and the proceeds of that sale are
"'See Wallach, supra note 4, at 323-27 (remedies against dissolved corpora-
tions). See also Schoone, Shareholder Liability Upon Voluntary Dissolution of
a Corporation, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 415 (1961) (remedies against shareholders of
dissolved corporation) [hereinafter cited as Schoone]; Henn & Alexander, supra
note 2 (remedies against purchasing corporation); Comment, Safeguarding the
Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1923) (remedies against pur-
chasing corporation).
42 See Comment, Suits By and Against Dissolved Corporations, 48 IowA L.
REV. 1006 (1963).
"See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr. v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797
(W.D. Mich. 1974). See also Wallach, supra note 4.
"TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art 5.10.B (Vernon 1980).
"Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 325, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971). See
also W. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at S 8127; Schoone, supra note 41, at 419.
41See Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159
A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), afl'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960); Farris
v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
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used to pay any known liabilities." Any remaining consideration
received from the sale is distributed to the shareholders." If plain-
tiff could pursue only the corporate entity,49 any claims arising
after the dissolution and distribution would go unsatisfied.
The "trust fund" theory arose to ameliorate such a situation by
providing the plaintiff with a defendant who could satisfy any of
his claims.5" The doctrine was developed over 150 years ago in
the aftermath of Wood v. DummerY In Dummer, Justice Story
set forth the notion that the capital stock of a dissolved corpora-
tion is "a pledge or trust fund" for creditors.' Even though the
corporate entity has vanished, its former stockholders hold the
proceeds from dissolution in trust for the benefit of the creditors."
Thus this doctrine provides a remedy where the corporation has
dissolved and has distributed its assets to shareholders before the
plaintiff's claim arises or matures."
In addition to the judicially created "trust fund" doctrine which
is utilized in many jurisdictions, statutory provisions dealing with
litigation by and against a dissolved corporation are now in effect
in every jurisdiction."' The statutes generally allow the dissolved
corporation to sue and to be sued for a period of time after its dis-
4 Wallach, supra note 4, at 327-28. See generally E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON
THE LAW OF MERGERS (1973) (different methods of corporate dissolution).
" Wallach, supra note 4, at 328.
11 Most sophisticated jurisdictions now provide a remedy against the directors,
officers and shareholders who received the proceeds from the sale of the cor-
poration's assets. See CAL CORP. CODE §5 2009, 2010; TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 7.12 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
11 See Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors Upon
Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate
Assets, 30 Bus. LAw. 1061 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Norton].
5 Id. at 1062. Although the trust fund theory was first set forth as dicta in
Wood v. Dummer, it was left to subsequent courts to define and to determine
the scope of the doctrine. Id. at 1064-67. See Norton, supra note 50.
52 Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
53 Id. at 438.
"See Norton, supra note 50, at 1061.
I For cases directly applying the "trust fund" doctrine, see cases cited in
Norton, supra note 50, at 1061 n.4.
"
8See, e.g., Thomas v. Harper, 14 Ariz. App. 140, 481 P.2d 510 (1971)
(applying ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 10-365(B)); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5400 (West
1978); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1975); 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at 8143; 8 Z. CAvITCH,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 5 189.02 (1979).
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solution." However, they vary slightly from state to state. The main
variable involves the length of time after the dissolution during
which a suit must be commenced by or against the dissolved cor-
poration." The time limits vary from two to five years."' These
statutes are not statutes of limitation but are postponed abatement
statutes. They merely modify the common law rule to postpone
the time of abatement, which normally is the date the dissolution
occurs.' This is true regardless of whether the statute of limita-
tions on the claim has begun to run. 1 Thus, if a creditor or prod-
ucts liability claimant fails to assert his claim against the dissolved
57About half of the states have statutes which resemble the MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. S 105 (as amended 1976) which provides:
The dissolution of a corporation shall not take away or impair
any remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors,
officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any
liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other pro-
ceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date of
such dissolution. Any such action or proceeding by or against the
corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation
in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors and officers shall
have power to take such corporate or other action as shall be appro-
priate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such corporation
was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time
during such period of two years so as to extend its period of
duration.
Citations to the state statutes are collected in the Model Business Corporation
Act Annotated following section 105.
'Wallach, supra note 4, at 324-25.
59 Most states have adopted a two or three year period. See 15 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 7, at § 8169. Another distinction among these varying statutes is
their authorization to plaintiffs to assert claims that arise after dissolution of
the seller. The wording of § 105 of the Model Act indicates that only claims
which arose before the dissolution of the corporation may be asserted during
the postponed abatement period. See Stone v. Gibson Refrigerator Sales
Corp., 366 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1973). However, in jurisdictions which
have not adopted the Model Act, the language of the statute may allow the
assertion of claims which arise following dissolution, if within the period pre-
scribed by the postponed abatement statute. See Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co.,
239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (construing Ohio statute). Jurisdictions
following the Model Act hold that where the incident which gave rise to the
claim occurred after the corporation's dissolution but before the statutory abate-
ment period's expiration, a plaintiff could not assert a claim based upon strict
liability in tort. Wallach, supra note 4, at 327.
"
0Wallach, supra note 4, at 325. At common law, the dissolution of the
corporation abated litigation already in progress and any cause of action which
existed against the corporation, even if the action had not yet been commenced.
Schoone, supra note 41, at 419.6 1Wallach, supra note 4, at 324-27.
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corporation within the time set by the applicable postponed abate-
ment statute, he will be unable to sue the dissolved corporation
even though the statute of limitations on his claim has not run.'
If the postponed abatement period has expired, the plaintiff's only
alternative will be to assert his claim against the shareholders of
the dissolved corporation under the "trust fund" theory." How-
ever, if the time period established by the postponed abatement
statute has run, the "trust fund" theory may also be unavailable to
the plaintiff. Jurisdictions vary as to whether the plaintiff may still
pursue the dissolved corporation's shareholders under the "trust
fund" theory." If the creditor or products liability claimant is
unable to recover from the dissolved corporation due to the expira-
tion of the postponed abatement period, or from the former share-
holders due to the unavailability of the "trust fund" doctrine, the
plaintiff will be forced to attempt to recover from the third party
who purchased the assets of the dissolved corporation.
III. LIABILITY OF THE PURCHASER OF ASSETS
OF A DISSOLVED CORPORATION
The rule that the corporation which acquires the assets of the
transferring corporation is not liable for the outstanding and con-
tingent liabilities of the transferor unless it has expressly assumed
those liabilities first arose in the context of creditor-debtor rela-
tionships." The underlying rationale for this rule is that the inter-
est of the new owners is superior to that of the creditors because
the creditors enjoy a right to repayment from the previous owners"
under such theories as the "trust fund" theory. As long as the
transferring corporation received adequate consideration for the
transfer of the business, the creditors lose nothing by being denied
an action against the transferee." In such a situation, the creditors
"Id. at 325.
See notes 50-55 supra, and accompanying text.
64See generally Norton, supra note 50, at 1976-77 (availability of "trust
fund" doctrine as a defense after postponed abatement period has expired).
65 See, e.g., Walbrun v. Babbitt, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 577 (1872); Gibson v.
Stevens, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 384 (1850).
11 See Note, Cyr v. B. Ojffen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees for
Product Injuries, 27 ME. L. REV. 305, 308-09 (1975).
"'See 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at §5 7122, 7123 (perm. rev. ed. 1973).
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are left with the same quantity of assets as that upon which they
were willing to extend their credit. 8 The argument to support this
theory is that the creditors of the transferring corporation would
be provided!' with a windfall if a cause of action against the acquir-
ing corporation was to be created. A windfall would result be-
cause the acquiring corporation often has more assets from which
the creditor's claim could be satisfied."0
The general rule of nonassumption of liability by the acquiring
corporation has been extended to cover product liability claims.'
However, support for the application of the general rule to products
liability claims is not as clear as it is for claims by creditors. The
rationale for holding the successor corporation liable for products
liability claims' arising from the use of products manufactured by
the transferring corporation is clear. The products liability plain-
tiff cannot anticipate subsequent or incidental damage claims;"3
" While the selling corporation may be able to satisfy only a part of the
creditors' claims out of the proceeds of the sale, the value of the business repre-
sents the security the creditors were initially willing to accept. Note, Cyr v. B.
Oflen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees for Product Injuries, 27 ME. L.
REV. 305, 309 (1975).
69 A windfall would result when the purchasing corporation has substantially
more assets with which creditors' claims could be satisfied than had the selling
corporation. If, for example, the creditor obtained a judgment for $100,000
against the seller, which had only $50,000 in assets, the creditor would not be
able to obtain full satisfaction of the judgment. However, if the creditor could
assert his $100,000 claim against the purchaser, which had assets of $200,000,
the creditor's judgment could be fully satisfied. The windfall to the creditor de-
rives from the fact that he was willing to risk his $100,000 knowing that the
original corporation had only $50,000 in assets to satisfy claims upon default.
Because the creditor lost part of his money on the risk he knowingly accepted,
his attempt to come forward and assert his claim against the purchasing corpora-
tion which has substantially more assets than the predecessor would constitute a
windfall. See Note, Cyr v. B. Oflen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees for
Product Injuries, 27 ME. L. REV. 305, 308-10 (1975).
70 Id. at 309.
71 Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Klober-
danz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); McKee v. Harris-
Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), afl'd, 118
N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
7' The requirement that privity exist between the products liability plaintiff
and the defendant has been greatly relaxed. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. REV.
1099 (1960).
7 See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1960); Comment, Product Liability-The
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unlike a creditor, he does not base his purchase of equipment upon
the financial soundness of the transferring corporation." Nor does
the products liability claimant have an active role in the formation
of a transaction that transfers the assets of one corporation to
another," a role a creditor may assume. Since the products liability
claimant neither bargains for the risk of non-payment of a judg-
ment against the selling corporation nor profits from the assump-
tion of that risk, he should not be limited to asserting his claim
against the selling corporation."8
Furthermore, unlike claims of creditors, a products liability
claim may arise long after the transferring corporation has dis-
solved and has distributed its assets to its shareholders." If the
lapse of time since the corporation's liquidation has been suffici-
ently long, the products liability plaintiff will be barred from suing
the dissolved corporation by the postponed abatement statutes.
Even if the "trust fund" doctrine is available in the jurisdiction
where the plaintiff asserts his claim, its use may be impractical if
the shareholders of the dissolved corporation have scattered or
have squandered away the assets they received or if they have
transferred the assets to bona fide purchasers so that the assets
are no longer traceable."
Initially, most courts applied the general rule, that the corpora-
tion which purchases the assets of another corporation is not lia-
ble for the selling corporation's liabilities, equally against both
products liability and creditor-debtor claims." As a result, in-
Expansion of Fraud, Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv.
1350, 1358 (1966).
"' Note, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees for Product
Injuries, 27 ME. L. REV. 305, 310 (1975).
75 Id.
78 Id.
71Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (injury to plaintiff
six years after liquidation); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (six years); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo.
1968) (four years); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 556 (1975) (two years); Powers v. Baker-Perkins, Inc., 92 Mich. App.
645, 285 N.W.2d 402 (1979) (sixteen years); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,
109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), afl'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480,
288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (forty years).
7 See generally Norton, supra note 50, at 1072-73 (traceability of corporate
assets upon dissolution).
"aSee, e.g., Walbrun v. Babbitt, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 577 (1872); Racine
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equitable results arose when plaintiffs were left without a remedy
or a defendant to sue. In an effort to end these inequitable results,
the courts developed several exceptions to the general rule of
non-liability of the purchaser."
Four generally recognized exceptions to the rule8 were explicitly
set forth in Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co.,' where the
court stated:
[W]here one company sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to
another company the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities
of the transferer, except where:
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such
debts; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger
of the seller and purchaser; (3) the purchasing corporation is
merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the trans-
action is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for
such debts.'
If one of these situations occurs, the unsatisfied creditor or prod-
ucts liability claimant of the selling corporation will be able to
recover from the purchasing corporation."
A. The Express and Implied Assumption of Liability and the
Fraudulent Transactions Exceptions
The express or implied assumption of liability and the fraud-
ulent transactions exceptions to the general rule of a purchaser's
nonliability are of little practical value. Under the express assump-
tion of liability exception, the purchasing corporation may volun-
tarily assume the liabilities of the selling corporation by an ex-
press agreement to do so.' The purchasing corporation also may
Engine Mach. Co. v. Confectioners' Mach. & Mfg. Co., 243 F. 876 (7th Cir.
1916).
"See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (continuity ex-
ception); Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (de facto merger).
11 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at §§ 7122, 7123. Some authors have
suggested that there are five exceptions to the general rule. See Note, Cyr v.
B. Often & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees For Product Injuries, 27 ME.
L. REv. 305, 307-08 (1975); Note, Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.,
6 SETON HALL L. REV. 477, 480-81 (1975).
1288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Clo. 1968).
8 Id. at 820.
"Id.
85 Winthrop, supra note 6, at 207.
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impliedly assume the liabilities of the seller.6 The liabilities as-
sumed may be contingent liabilities as well as those to identifiable
creditors. However, the purchasing corporation can avoid an
implied assumption of liabilities by enumerating the liabilities
which are to be assumed and explicitly excluding the assumption
of all liabilities not enumerated.' Under the fraudulent transaction
exception, both creditors and products liability claimants can
have a transaction set aside if they can prove an intent to defraud
on the part of the seller."
Although the courts have often cited these situations as excep-
tions to the general rule of purchaser nonliability, most courts
have not employed them in finding successor corporations liable.'1
In most cases, the corporation purchasing the assets of the selling
corporation assumes certain liabilities and expressly denies any
responsibility for those liabilities not expressly assumed." Thus
there is little question as to what liabilities have been expressly or
impliedly assumed by the purchaser. When there is no such assump-
tion of liability, it is often easier for the plaintiff to prove, and
for the court to find, successor liability under another exception
which does not require a showing of intent to defraud." Thus,
8Id.
87 Id.
"McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 563, 264 A.2d 98, 102
(Super. Ct. 1970), afl'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1972). See also Winthrop, supra note 6, at 207; Comment, Assumption of
Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 95 (1975);
Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128 (D.N.J. 1976).
" See generally Wallach, supra note 4, at 337 n.62 (cases cited). See
also Luedecke v. Des Moines Cabinet Co., 140 Iowa 223, 118 N.W. 456 (1908);
Tinio, Similarity of Ownership or Control as Basis for Charging Corporation
Acquiring Assets of Another with Liability for Former Owner's Debts, Annot.,
49 A.L.R.3d 881, 884-90 (1973).
"See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968);
Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at §
7122, 7123.
"' See, e.g., Cinocca v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 527 (E.D.
Okla. 1975); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
"I See Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); McKee
v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super St. 1970), afl'd,
118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
"See Comment, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions,
55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 95 (1975); Note, Cyr v. B. Often & Co.: Liability of Business
Transferees For Product Injuries, 27 ME. L. REV. 305, 311 (1975).
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the courts have relied upon the continuation!' and de facto merger
exceptions, 95 as well as the newly developed exception for strict
products liability cases," to impose liability on a successor cor-
poration.
B. The Continuity Exception
Another of the generally recognized exceptions to the rule of
successor nonliability is that the purchasing corporation may be
held responsible for the liabilities of the selling corporation if it
is merely a continuation of the seller." This exception is em-
ployed by the courts more often than are the fraud or express and
implied assumptions exceptions," but it is used less frequently
than is the exception for de facto mergers.' One reason for the
courts' reluctance to use the continuity exception is that they have
been unable to agree upon the factual elements necessary to war-
rant application of the doctrine."® As a result, the doctrine is am-
biguous and its parameters have yet to be clearly defined.1"'
Under the continuity exception, the purchasing corporation
will be held liable for the seller's obligations if the purchaser is
4 Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Note,
Cyr v. B. Often & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees For Product Injuries,
27 ME. L. REV. 305, 312 n.34 (1975) (cases cited).
I Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974);
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958); Applestein v.
United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div.), afg'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960); Jennings Neff & Co. v. Crystal
Ice Co., 128 Tenn. 231, 159 S.W. 1088 (1913).
'6 See notes 195-99 and accompanying text infra.
"'See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); McKee v.
Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), aff'd,
118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
9 See Winthrop, supra note 6, at 207; Comment, Assumption of Products
Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 95 (1975).9 See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 586 F.2d 361 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (defacto merger); Turner v. Bituminous
Gas Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976) (de facto merger); Farris
v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958). Cf. Cyr. v. B. Offen &
Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (both continuity and de facto merger).
109 Note, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees For Product
Injuries, 27 ME. L. REV. 305, 312-16 (1975). See also Wallach, supra note 7,
at 338-40; Comment, Assumption of Products Liability In Corporate Acquisi-
tions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 100-07 (1975).
"
0 1 See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1151 (lst Cir. 1974).
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in most respects merely a continuation of the selling corporation.'"
What constitutes "most respects" varies greatly from court to court.
The continuity exception generally can be divided according to
its two interpretations: (1) where the exception has been con-
strued narrowly to apply only to changes in the form of the busi-
ness entity,"1 and (2) where the exception has been construed
more broadly to cover situations involving changes in ownership. '
Courts which have construed the continuity exception narrowly
have applied it in situations where the only change in the selling
corporation has involved the form of the business entity." Ex-
amples of this are recapitalizations or alterations in the name or
place of incorporation.' 0 Two cases where the courts have con-
strued the continuity exception in this narrow fashion are McKee
v. Harris-Seybold Co., "' and Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing
Co. 1
08
In McKee, the court determined that in order for liability to
attach to the purchasing corporation, it must represent no more
than a "new hat" for the seller."' Since the seller in McKee con-
tinued in existence after the sale of its assets and was able to
satisfy its debts, the purchasing corporation was not a mere con-
tinuation of the seller."* Borrowing the court's analogy to a "new
hat", the transaction in McKee would be more appropriately char-
acterized as a complete change in wardrobe.
102 It has been suggested that one concept of continuity relates to ownership
of the stock of the business entities before and after the sale of the assets, while
another concept is based upon the income tax consequences of the transaction.
Note, Cyr v. B. Oflen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees For Product
Injuries, 27 ME. L. REV. 305, 312 (1975).
"° See, e.g., Forest Laboratories v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 626 (7th
Cir. 1971); Lopata v. Bemis, 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Kloberdanz v.
Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). See also Comment, Assumption
of Products Liability In Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 100-01
(1975).
104See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152 (1st Cir. 1974).
101 See Forest Laboratories v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
'10 Id. at 626.
107 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super.
480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
108288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
100 109 N.J. Super. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106.
110 The McKee court concluded that there was no continuation of the selling
corporation, even though the vice-president, secretary and treasurer of the seller
were employed by the purchaser. 109 N.J. Super. at 564, 264 A.2d at 103.
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The Kloberdanz court was more specific in defining its criteria
for application of the continuity exception. The court determined
that the continuity exception did not apply because the seller con-
tinued to exist after the sale and because the stock and the directors,
officers and shareholders of the two corporations were not identi-
cal.11' The decisive factor in both the McKee and Kloberdanz deci-
sions is that there was a change in ownership and thus a substantial
change in the form of the business entity. Thus the crucial factor
in the determination of whether the continuity exception will apply
under its narrow view exception would seem to be that a sufficient
continuation of an interest from the seller to the buyer must exist.
If a sufficient continuity occurs, the change in form will be dis-
regarded and the purchaser will be responsible for the liabilities
of the seller. If no continuity exists, successor nonliability will
follow. Due to the lack of continuity, the defendants in McKee
and Kloberdanz were absolved of liability for their predecessors'
actions.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania also has adhered to a narrow interpretation of the
continuity doctrine. In Lopata v. Bemis Co." the court held
that in order for there to be a continuation of the selling corpora-
tion there must be both a continuation of its business operations
and a continuation of the original corporate entity.11 Factors which
would provide sufficient evidence of the continuation of the sell-
ing corporation would be the common identity of shareholders
and directors of the seller and purchaser and the existence of
only one corporation after the transaction.11' The court concluded
that the exception was inapplicable in Lopata because only one
director and the vice-president of the selling corporation assumed
positions with the new corporation.111 Furthermore, the selling
corporation continued to operate as a separate corporate entity
" 288 F. Supp. at 821-22. The court also stated that the adequacy of the
consideration received by the selling corporation and the nonfraudulent nature of
the transaction were additional factors which indicated that the purchasing cor-
poration should not be held liable for the torts of the seller. Id. at 822.
112 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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after the sale of most of its assets.""
Not all courts have adopted this narrow view of the continuity
exception. One case which clearly imposed liability based upon
an expansive application of the continuation theory was Cyr v.
B. Often & Co."' The plaintiff brought suit against the purchas-
ing corporation due to injuries caused by a defect in a machine
manufactured years earlier by the company which had sold the
purchaser its assets."' There was no continuity of ownership al-
though the purchaser claimed to have been in business for forty
years and used the seller's name."' The court noted that the pur-
chasing corporation had taken over an ongoing business, had as-
sumed all of the benefits of the business from its predecessor, had
continued to function as had the selling corporation, and had
produced the same product and employed the same persons. Des-
pite the complete change in ownership, the effect of these facts was
sufficient to impose liability upon the purchaser under the continua-
tion theory. '" Thus it appears that courts which utilize a broader
interpretation of the continuation theory may find the exception
applicable despite a change in the selling corporation's ownership
if the business activities of the seller are continued unaltered by
the purchaser under the control of the persons who managed the
selling corporation.''
C. The De Facto Merger Exception
The exception to the general rule of successor nonliability most
frequently employed by the courts is the de facto merger doctrine."'
Liability for claims against the predecessor automatically attaches
to the successor corporation in a statutory merger or consolida-
"a Id.




"'1 Id. at 1151. See also Comment, Assumption of Products Liability In Cor-
porate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REv. 86, 101 (1975); Note, Cyr v. B. Offen &
Co.: Liability of Business Transferees For Product Injuries, 27 ME. L. REV.
305 (1975).
' See, e.g., Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U.S. 522 (1939);
Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d
873 (1976).
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tion.In However, corporations have been able to avoid this suc-
cessor liability by structuring the merger or consolidation to ap-
pear to be a sale of assets."
The de facto merger doctrine is a judicial creation to protect
the fights of creditors,"2 tort victims," and dissenting minority
shareholders"' in transactions where substantially all of the assets
of one corporation are sold to another."' The doctrine provides
that when a transaction had all the indices of a merger, except
for failure to conform with the statutory merger requirements, the
successor corporation will be subject to all the legal consequences
of a merger.'" Thus, the successor corporation will be responsible
for all debts and contingent liabilities of the predecessor corpora-
tion."' In applying the doctrine, the courts look to the transaction
as a whole to determine whether the transfer has sufficient char-
acteristics of a merger to warrant a judicial finding of de facto
merger, and its accompanying liability.' 31
A survey of past decisions involving de facto mergers is helpful
"See Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 348,
159 A.2d 146, 154 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), afl'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960).
See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at § 7122 (statutes cited); Freling,
supra note 14, at 1130-36.
24 See, e.g., Jennings Neff & Co. v. Crystal Ice Co., 128 Tenn. 231, 159
S.W. 1088 (1913).
2' See, e.g., Cinocca v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Okla.
1975); Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
2'See, e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.
Mich. 1974); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159
A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), af0'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960). See
also Note, Corporations-Successor's Tort Liability for Acts or Omissions of
Predecessor-Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 676 (1975).
" 2See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958);
Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 136 N.W.2d 410 (1965).
"'See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 367 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cinocca v. Baxter Laboratories,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Okla. 1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379
F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
"See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 367 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.,
379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp.
342 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" See Winthrop, supra note 6, at 197-98.
"Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 432, 143 A.2d 25, 28 (1958);
Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See Comment, Assumption of Products
Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 96 (1975).
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in determining how closely a transaction between two or more
corporations must resemble a statutory merger before a court will
find a de facto merger. The different jurisdictions that have faced
de facto merger claims are not in complete agreement on the
relevance and importance of the various elements involved in a
purchase of assets to the determination of whether a de facto
merger has taken place. All courts seem to agree, however, that a
continued interest by the seller's shareholders in the purchase is
required."' Therefore, if the purchaser does not utilize its own
stock to pay for the assets it acquires, no de facto merger will be
held to have occurred.13
The de facto merger doctrine first arose in the context of claims
by unsatisfied creditors and by minority shareholders seeking to
protect their appraisal rights."' One early case involving the de
facto merger exception and the rights of minority shareholders
was Farris v. Glen Alden Corp." In Farris, the minority share-
holders of List Industries brought suit to enjoin a transaction
which they alleged effectively constituted a merger." The trans-
12 See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Travis
v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977) (Ohio and Indiana law); Shannon
v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Bazan v.
Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v.
Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968).
132See Verhein v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1979)
(Wisconsin law); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 566, 264
A.2d 98, 104 (Super. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (no de facto merger); Western Reserve Life Ins.
Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Winthrop, supra note 6, at 208; Comment, Assumption of Products
Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 99 (1975).
134The shareholders who dissent from a corporate merger or a sale of the
corporation's assets have the right in most states to require the corporation to
purchase their shares at a judicially determined price. See, e.g., Teschner v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974); Acree v.
E.I.F.C., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1973); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Colonial Realty
Corp., 190 A.2d 752 (Del. 1963). See also Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware:
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (1963) (con-
tractual right to demand that corporation fulfill purpose for which it was created).
132393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
" Almost all jurisdictions have granted the right of dissent and appraisal to
shareholders of merging corporations. See Lattin, Minority and Dissenting
Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 307
(1958). See generally Note, Intercorporate Sale of Assets Unifying Stockholder
Interest Held De Facto Merger and Enjoined for Failure to Notify of Appraisal
Rights Under Merger Statute, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1959) (minority share-
holder's rights under de facto merger doctrine).
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action involved the sale of all of the assets of List Industries to
the Glen Alden Corporation in exchange for Glen Alden stock.'31
This stock was to be distributed to the shareholders of List and
the corporation was then to dissolve."8 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in holding for the plaintiffs, ruled that a de facto merger
had occurred." The court stressed that when a transaction is one
in which "a corporation combines with another so as to lose its
essential nature and alter the original fundamental relationships
of the shareholders among themselves and to the corporation, 1 .
the substance and consequences of the transaction must prevail
over the form of the agreement."1 In such a situation, the court
would find a de facto merger in order to protect the rights of dis-
senting minority shareholders of the selling corporation.'
The "substance over form" approach of Farris was followed in
Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp.,'' where minority
shareholders claimed that the transaction was, in effect, a merger."
Although the court did not cite specific criteria for its finding that
a de facto merger had occurred, other than the "substance over
form" test, it did point out that many of the elements necessary
to qualify a transaction under the New Jersey merger statutes
were present. "
13 393 Pa. at 428, 143 A.2d at 27.
38Id. See also Jennings Neff & Co. v. Crystal Ice Co., 128 Tenn. 231,
159 S.W. 1088 (1913); Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 136 N.W.2d
410 (1965); Note, Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 6 SETON HALL L.
REV. 477, 482 (1975).
1"392 Pa. at 434, 143 A.2d at 31.
40 Id. at 433, 143 A.2d at 29.
141 Id. at 432, 143 A.2d at 28.
1 Id. at 433, 143 A.2d at 29.
14 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 33 N.J. 72,
161 A.2d 474 (1960).
I"Id. at 336-37, 159 A.2d at 148.
"'The court pointed out a number of factors in Applestein that would also
have been present if the parties had merged under the New Jersey merger statute:
(1) a transfer of all the shares and all the assets of Interstate to
United; (2) an assumption by United of Interstate's liabilities;
(3) a "pooling of interests" of the two corporations; (4) the
absorption of Interstate by United, and the dissolution of Interstate;
(5) a joinder of officers and directors from both corporations on
an enlarged board of directors; (6) the present executive and oper-
ating personnel of Interstate will be retained in the employ of
United; and (7) the shareholders of the absorbed corporation,
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As the de facto merger doctrine gained judicial acceptance, its
use was extended from cases involving claims by creditors and
minority shareholders' to those involving products liability actions
against the successor corporation."" By applying the doctrine of
de facto mergers to strict products liability cases, general theories
of corporate law have been expanded by the public policy con-
siderations often present in those cases.
The fundamental basis for imposing strict tort liability on a
manufacturer was first expressed in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products,' decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1962.
The court held that if a manufacturer knows that a product which
it places on the market will be used without inspection for defects,
the manufacturer will be held strictly liable in tort if the product
later proves to have a defect that causes personal injury.' Three
primary policy reasons exist for imposing strict tort liability on a
manufacturer: ( 1 ) the consumer is entitled to rely on the product's
being what it purports to be, and not a dangerous instrumentality;
(2) the imposition of such liability upon the manufacturer acts as
an inducement for it to improve the safety of the product, and
serves as a deterrent against the sale of other defective products;
(3) the manufacturer is in a better position to bear the loss caused
by a dangerous product, since it can pass the loss on to customers
and thus effectively distribute the loss throughout society.!"
Interstate, as represented by the sole stockholder, Epstein, will sur-
render his 1,250 shares in Interstate for 160,000 newly issued shares
in United, the amalgamated enterprise.
Id. at 348, 159 A.2d at 154.
10See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958);
Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 136 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Jennings
Neff & Co. v. Crystal Ice Co., 128 Tenn. 231, 159 S.W. 1088 (1913). See also
Note, Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 477,
482 (1975).
.. See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.,
379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Ger-
hardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1 459 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
149 Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
"o See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960); See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS ch. 13
(4th ed. 1971); James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957); Keeton, Products Liability
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Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co."' presents an example
of the expansion of the de facto merger doctrine1 into product
liability cases. The plaintiff, a workman, sought damages for a
personal injury resulting from use of a "hydra-hook" on an oil
drilling rig. The Joy Manufacturing Company earlier had paid cash
for substantially all of the manufacturing assets of the corporation
which produced the "hydra-hook," including its name and trade-
mark." ' In addition, Joy had assumed certain liabilities of the
seller as set forth in the sales contract, and the selling corporation
had continued in existence for ten months after the sale.1' The
Kloberdanz court found that no de facto merger had occurred and
thus there had been no assumption of liability by the purchasing
corporation." The court emphasized that the transaction had
been conducted at arms-length, with adequate consideration paid,
and that there had been no carryover of officers or shareholders'
interest from the selling corporation to the purchasing corpora-
tion." ' In addition, the seller's retention of some assets indicated
that a severance of assets from the corporate entity rather than
a merger had occurred." ' In emphasizing the arms-length nature
of the transaction and the fact that adequate consideration had
been paid for the assets, the court indicated that the underlying
purpose for the doctrine of successor liability was the need to
protect creditors against the seller's inability to meet its obligations
-Some Observations About Allocation of Risk, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329 (1966);
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways & Meanings of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).
"I See generally 1 FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 5.06
(1979); Recent Developments, Products Liability-Liability of Transferee for
Defective Products Manufactured by Transferor, 30 VAND. L. REv. 238 (1977);
Recent Developments, Products Liability-Corporations-Asset Sales and Suc-
cessor Liability, 44 TENN. L. REv. 905 (1977).
1 5288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
"
15 d. at 818-19.
3'Id. at 818-20,
1 Id. at 821-22. The court held that there was no express or implied assump-
tion of tort liability because the parties had intended, and the sales contract
had provided, that the selling corporation would retain such liabilities. Id. at 821.
I Id. at 822.
57 Certain real and personal property of the selling corporation were not
acquired by the purchasing corporation. Id. at 818-19.
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if adequate consideration were not received."8
Another case involving the application of the doctrine to a
products liability claim was McKee v. Harris Seybold Corp.1'
In McKee, the plaintiff attempted to hold the Harris-Seybold Cor-
poration liable under the de facto merger doctrine for injuries
caused by an allegedly defective product manufactured by Seybold,
the predecessor corporation. Seybold had sold its assets, business
and goodwill to the purchasing corporation more than forty years
before the injury occurred, receiving a mixture of cash and stock
in return. Seybold had continued in existence for fourteen months
after the sale, but had refrained from any active manufacturing
during that time. Relying upon the analysis used in Kloberdanz,
the McKee court found no de facto merger.' The court held that
a sufficient continuity of shareholder interests from the selling cor-
poration to the purchasing corporation, as well as an absorption
of the corporation identity of the seller by the purchaser, were
essential elements for the existence of a de facto merger."' The
court indicated that the receipt of cash by the selling corporation
for its assets did not yield the required continuity of interest by
the seller's shareholders in the purchaser."' Furthermore, there was
no absorption of the selling corporation's identity into the purchas-
ing corporation because the seller continued in existence for four-
teen months after the transaction."' Since the elements of con-
tinuity of shareholder interest and assimilation of corporate iden-
tity were absent, the selling and purchasing corporations remained
"strangers after the sale" ''0 and no de facto merger had occurred.
1581 Id. at 820-21.
159 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), afl'd, 118 N.J. Super.
480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
'l Id. at 567, 264 A.2d at 106.
161 Id. at 566, 264 A.2d at 104. Although some shares of the purchasing
corporation were transferred to the selling corporation, the court felt that the
continuity of the shareholders' interest was negligible due to the small percent-
age of the consideration which was received in the form of stock. Id.
162 Id.
113 Id. Accord Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
(dissolution ten months after acquisition); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288
F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (ten months); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22,
136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (1977).
14 109 N.J. Super. at 566, 264 A.2d at 104. See Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg.
Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 85 Nev. 276,
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Knapp v. North Ameri-
can Rockwell Corp.,"' took a more liberal stance than the McKee
court regarding the degree to which the selling corporation must
be absorbed by the purchasing corporation at the time of sale. In
Knapp, the plaintiff brought a product liability action against the
North American Rockwell Corporation. He claimed that he had
been injured while using a piece of machinery manufactured by
a corporation that had later sold substantially all of its assets to
North American in exchange for stock in that corporation.1" As
part of the agreement, the selling corporation had agreed to dis-
solve and had done so eighteen months after the transaction."'
The court reviewed earlier decisions in other jurisdictions whose
courts, under facts similar to those in Knapp, probably would have
found that a sale rather than a de facto merger had occurred." '
In contrast to these prior decisions, however, the Knapp court
found that a de facto merger had occurred."' In so holding, the
court expanded the de facto merger doctrine to encompass public
policy considerations normally associated with the law of strict
products liability." '
Although the court's finding of a de facto merger was ultimately
based on policy considerations of strict products liability law,1'
454 P.2d 24 (1969). See generally Note, Knapp v. North American Rockwell
Corp., 6 SETON HALL L. REv. 477, 488 n.73 (1975).
165506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
1 IJd. at 362.
167 Id. at 363.
168 Id. at 364-67. See, e.g., Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250
(E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo.
1968); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 85 Nev. 276, 454 P.2d 24 (1969); McKee v.
Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), aff'd,
118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972). See also
Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (1977).
1'9 Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
'n The Knapp court reasoned that "the philosophy of the Pennsylvania courts
[is] that questions of an injured party's rights to seek recovery are to be
resolved by an analysis of public policy considerations rather than by a mere
prosecution application of formalities." 506 F.2d at 369.
171 Id. at 369. The underlying purpose for application of public policy con-
siderations of strict tort liability to the question of liability of successor corpora-
tions was aptly stated in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974),
where recovery was based on the continuity exception. The Cyr court reasoned
that the purchasing corporation, like the actual manufacturer, was in a better
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it did attempt to structure its analysis around the corporate law
aspects of the de facto merger doctrine. The court stated that "a
number of considerations indicated the insubstantiality of the
continued existence of [the selling corporation], including the
brevity of the corporation's continued life, the contractual require-
ment that [it] be dissolved as soon as possible, the prohibition on
engaging in normal business transactions, and the character of
the assets [it] controlled.'"" This statement indicated the court's
willingness to relax, based upon public policy considerations, the
assimilation requirements of the de facto merger doctrine as set
forth in McKee."' If the court had applied the strict assimilation
test, exemplified in McKee and Kloberdanz, it would have con-
cluded that there had been no assimilation of the selling corpora-
tion into the purchasing corporation since the seller continued
in existence for eighteen months. Instead of finding a de facto
merger, the court would have concluded that the case involved a
mere sale of assets.
This mixture of the de facto merger doctrine and policy con-
siderations of products liability law has been utilized by courts
in other jurisdictions. About the time Knapp was being handed
down, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan faced a products liability action involving facts simi-
lar to those in Knapp. In Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.," the
district court found that a de facto merger had occurred and that
Langston, the purchasing corporation, was thus liable for the in-
jury resulting from the plaintiff's use of a machine manufactured
position than injured consumers to determine the risks of injury from products
and the costs of meeting such risks because of the carryover of expertise and
experience from the original manufacturer. The purchasing corporation is just
as capable as was the selling corporation of spreading the costs of injuries caused
by defective products throughout society by reflecting such costs in the price
of the product. The court went on to state: "The successor knows the product,
is as able to calculate the risk of defects of the predecessor, is in position to
insure therefore and reflect such cost in sale negotiations, and is the only entity
capable of improving the quality of the product." id. at 1154. Accord Shannon
v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Ray v. Alad
Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
'7 506 F.2d at 367.
173 The McKee test for the existence of a de facto merger is set forth at notes
73-74, 107-10 supra, and accompanying text.
174 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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by the selling corporation."5 Aware of the public policy considera-
tions in products liability actions, the court recited the indices of
a de facto merger: (1) continuity of the selling corporation's man-
agement, personnel, physical location, assets and overall business
operations; (2) continuity of ownership interest in the selling cor-
poration's shareholders by their receipt of stock from the purchasing
corporation; (3) the liquidation and dissolution of the selling
corporation as promptly as possible, and; (4) the assumption by
the purchaser of those obligations of the seller necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal operations."7
Courts have felt the need to expand the de facto merger doc-
trine to encompass products liability claims to protect plaintiffs
from inequitable results if they were unable to pursue the selling
corporation or its former shareholders. In such cases, the plain-
tiffs would have no recovery unless one were allowed against the
successor corporation. For this reason, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Knapp felt compelled to extend the de facto merger
doctrine beyond its ordinary scope to hold the successor corpora-
tion liable." The court recognized that the ordinary consumer
cannot protect himself from the risks of defective products as
effectively as can the selling corporation, and that he is less cap-
able of spreading the losses caused by such products throughout
the community."' Similarly, the Shannon court, holding the pur-
chasing corporation liable under the de facto merger doctrine, rea-
soned that "Itihe public policy behind the evolving common law
of products liability is that the enterprise, the going concern, ought
to bear the liability for the damages done by its defective
products."
79
A successor corporation, for purposes of planning and obtaining
insurance, needs to know the extent of the liabilities it has assumed.
Every acquisition is carefully tailored to the exact business and
tax needs of the selling and purchasing corporations. Thus a cor-
15Id. at 801.
176 Id.
"' See Note, Products Liability Under the De Facto Merger Doctrine-Knapp
v. North American Rockwell Corp., 49 TEMP. L. Q. 1014, 1019 (1976).
'78 506 F.2d at 369. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
'79 379 F. Supp. at 802.
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poration will hesitate to invest in a business unless it receives
assurances that it will be responsible only for those liabilities it
has voluntarily assumed. The de facto merger doctrine originally
was applied only to the claims of creditors and dissenting share-
holders of the original corporation. However, with the expansion
of the doctrine, claims of products liability plaintiffs now may
be asserted against the successor corporation based upon the
alleged existence of a de facto merger. The cases discussed above
indicate that various courts, attempting to incorporate into the
de facto merger doctrine public policy considerations of the law
of strict products liability, have formulated different criteria for
finding a de facto merger. Thus, the expansion of the doctrine
due to these policy considerations has led to confusion regarding
the exact extent of the successor's assumption of liability. As one
commentator has stated:
[G]iven the disparate definitions applied to "de facto" merger in
various jurisdictions, combined with the multijurisdictional nature
of many acquisitions, the obstacles to satisfying relevant judicial
criteria may seem hopelessly blocked with undecipherably intricate
or even invisible barriers.'
Other jurisdictions faced with strict products liability claims
have also combined public policy considerations with the de facto
merger doctrine to reach the desired result."' The varying weight
which the courts give to these policy considerations has led them
to propose different criteria which must be satisfied before the
transaction will be considered a de facto merger rather than a
sale of assets.' Despite the variation among the different courts,
two factors consistently have been required by most jurisdictions
for a de facto merger to be found. The first is a continuity of
ownership by the selling corporation's shareholders in the new
entity.8 ' The second is a liquidation of the selling corporation
'80 Winthrop, supra note 6, at 206.
"' See Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). But
see Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
182 See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F.
Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich 1974).
"8 This factor was considered particularly determinative in Shannon v.
Samuel Langston Co. See also Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136
Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553
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within a reasonable time'" after the transaction.'"
IV. RESPONSES TO THE EXPANSION OF THE
DE FACTO MERGER DOCTRINE
Many jurisdictions have attempted to incorporate public policy
considerations of strict products liability into the de facto merger
doctrine. At least one jurisdiction's courts, however, have re-
cently attempted to limit the applicability of the doctrine,'" while
another jurisdiction has abolished the doctrine by legislation.'8'
A. Judicial Response
The California Supreme Court, in Ray v. Alad Corp.," has
limited the applicability of the de facto merger doctrine. In Ray,
the plaintiff was injured while using a defective ladder manufac-
tured by a corporation which had sold its assets to the defendant
Alad Corporation in exchange for stock. 8' The assets purchased by
Alad included the seller's plant, equipment, inventory, goodwill
and trade name. ' In addition, the purchaser continued to use the
same equipment, product design, personnel and sales representa-
tives and sold to the predecessor's customers the same line of
ladders which the predecessor had formerly manufactured and
marketed. 9' The court specifically rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion that the sale of assets in exchange for stock had resulted in
a de facto merger.""
S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Turner v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976) (absence of an exchange
of stock not conclusive).
'"See Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
(10 months too long); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo.
1968); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super.
Ct. 1970), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1972) (one year).
185 Comment, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions,
55 B.U.L. REv. 86, 99 (1975).
'"1 Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
187 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10.A(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
'Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1977).
"'Id. at 25, 550 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
'Id. at 24-25, 560 P.2d at 5-6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
I' Id. at 25, 550 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
M Id. at 30, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
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In deciding the Ray case, the California Supreme Court refused
to use the de facto merger doctrine to achieve a result that would
satisfy the public policy underlying strict products liability law
of spreading the cost of an injury throughout society." Instead,
the court held that the de facto merger doctrine would apply only
to transactions where: (1) the consideration paid for the selling
corporation's assets was inadequate so that claims of the seller's
creditors would go unsatisfied or (2) the consideration received
by the selling corporation consisted entirely of the purchasing cor-
poration's stock which was promptly distributed to the seller's
shareholders, followed by the liquidation of the seller.9
Although the court in Ray did not find a de facto merger, the
plaintiff's claims were upheld on other grounds.' The successor
corporation was held liable under the theory of strict products
liability.' " The court reasoned that the plaintiff would face in-
"'See id. at 30-31, 560 P.2d at 11-12, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
" Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580. Rawlings v. D. M. Oliver,
Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, __ P.2d -, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979), expanded
the Ray holding by finding that a failure to continue manufacturing the identical
product does not prevent it from meeting the defacto merger standard set forth
in Ray.
"9 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 15, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
96 Id. at 32-34, 560 P.2d at 13-15, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 584-86. Several courts
have specifically rejected the product line argument of Ray. In Domine v. Fulton
Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (1979), the court specifically
rejected the strict tort liability theory as constituting an exception to the general
rule of nonliability of successor corporations. The court stated:
The corporate successor to the manufacturer of a defective
product cannot be said to have created the risk, and, except in a
very remote way, does not reap the profit derived from the sale of
the product. Moreover, the successor corporation has neither invited
use of the product nor represented to the public that the product
is safe and suitable for use. Finally, we do not believe that the
public interest in human life and health would be served by adoption
of Ray. The corporate successor is not in a position to exert any
pressure upon the manufacturer to enhance the safety of the
product.
395 N.E.2d at 23. Thus Illinois accepts only the generally recognized exceptions
to successor nonliability. These exceptions encompass situations: (1) where the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the purchaser and seller;
(2) where the purchaser is a mere continuation of the seller, or; (3) where the
transaction is for the purpose of fraudulently escaping liability. Id. at 22.
See also Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977)
(applying Wisconsin law); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977)
(applying Ohio and Indiana law); Woody v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 463 F.
Supp. 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); Andrews v. John
E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979) (applying Alabama law).
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superable costacles attempting to obtain satisfaction of a judg-
ment from stockholders or directors of the original corporation
due to its dissolution."' Thus it held for the plaintiff on the ground
that a party who acquires a manufacturing business and con-
tinues the output of its line of products assumes strict liability for
defects in products manufactured and distributed by the acquired
entity.9 In reaching its decision, the court used the same public
policy reasoning as was advanced in Knapp and Shannon. It con-
cluded that the justifications for imposition of strict liability on
a successor were:
1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of
the business, 2) the successor's ability to assume the original
manufacturer's risk, and 3) the fairness of requiring the successor
to assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden
necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's goodwill being
enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the busi-
ness.'9
Other jurisdictions have erred in their application of the de facto
merger doctrine. They have ruled that the public policy considera-
tions of strict products liability warrant imposition of liability on
the surviving corporation, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a
creditor, minority shareholder or consumer of the manufacturer's
products. Searching for a doctrine with which to impose such lia-
bility, many courts have seized upon the de facto merger doctrine."
By manipulating the theory, they have imposed liability on the
successor corporation even though there have been few indices
of a true corporate merger. In contrast, the Ray court kept the
197 19 Cal. 3d at 32, 560 P.2d at 13, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
198 Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 15, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 586. Contra Menacho v.
Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128 (D. N.J. 1976) (no social policy served
by imposing unbargained-for liability on a corporation just because it purchases
assets).
"1 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 12, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 583. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980)
(applying California law), has indicated that the fundamental requirement for
the imposition of successor liability under Ray is that the successor receive the
benefits of the continuation of the predecessor's business and goodwill.
100 Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp.
797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich.
1976).
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de facto merger doctrine within the strict framework of corporate
law originally intended by its creators."' The court would find a
de facto merger only when an exchange of assets for stock and a
liquidation of the selling corporation, the true indices of a cor-
porate merger, were present or when inadequate consideration
was received by the seller."'
The implication of the Ray decision is that products liability
plaintiffs will have a greater chance of recovering on claims against
the successor corporation than will creditors or minority share-
holders. Under the facts of Ray, a creditor's or minority share-
holder's only method of recovering from the successor corporation
would be to claim that a de facto merger had occurred. However,
the strict interpretation of the doctrine by the California Supreme
Court would preclude recovery under this theory. In contrast, the
products liability claimant would be allowed to recover from the
successor corporation even though the indices of a de facto merger
were not present.
This holding provides an element of uncertainty in the typical
purchase of assets transaction. The successor corporation will be
liable for products liability claims despite its express denial of
the assumption of such contingent liabilities in the sales contract.
Corporate planners thus are confronted with a dilemma since the
acquiring corporation faces the prospect of liability for claims
arising from the use of products manufactured by the selling cor-
poration.' An acquiring corporation would prefer to insulate itself
from this liability or to place the burden of loss upon the corpora-
tion which manufactured the faulty product. The holding in
Ray will not allow the acquiring corporation to shift this bur-
den to the selling corporation, at least for products liability
claims. The acquiring corporation may, however, shift the burden
2" See Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa.
1957); Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 136 N.W.2d 410 (1965);
note 134 supra, and accompanying text.
202 This would apparently correspond to the fraud exception to the general rule
of non-successor liability. See notes 83-85 supra, and accompanying text.
"I This problem can be particularly troublesome when a transaction involves
a transfer of assets which have a very long useful life. See generally McKee v.
Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), af'd,
118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972) (plaintiff injured in 1968 on paper
cutting machined manufactured in 1916).
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of loss on to the selling corporation for creditors' or minority
shareholders' claims if the transaction does not constitute a de
facto merger under the criteria set forth in Ray.
Other alternatives for insulating the acquiring corporation
against liability have been suggested,' but these may not be
viable. " One suggested method is to deflate the purchase price
for the purchasing corporation to reflect the risk of loss due to
such claims or the cost of insurance to cover the risk.' However,
the risk of loss is often difficult to calculate and the inclusion of
such a factor, in the purchase price, once it is calculated, may
prove so prohibitive that the seller will be unwilling to consum-
mate the sale." ' Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to obtain products liability insurance.'"
Despite the strong arguments in favor of avoiding the imposi-
tion of liability on the successor corporation for products liability
claims, public policy considerations demand such an outcome.
As the California Supreme Court stated in Price v. Shell Oil Co.:"'
"The paramount policy to be promoted by the rule [of strict prod-
ucts liability] is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims
of manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout society of
the cost of compensating them.""1 0 In light of this overriding public
policy, the extension in Ray of liability for products liability claims
to a successor corporation is a correct result.
B. Legislative Response
The de facto merger doctrine was introduced in Texas in
Western Resources Life Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt."'1 In Gerhardt,
the plaintiffs alleged that fraudulent techniques had been used to
induce them to purchase insurance contracts."' Several years later,
'
" See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Shannon v.
Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).





209 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 CaL Rptr. 178 (1970).
21
0 Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82.
2" 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2t
2 Id. at 785. The plaintiffs' cause of action arose from the purchase of six
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the insurance company sold all of its assets to the defendant West-
ern Resources Life in exchange for stock of that company.1 The
seller was to dissolve and to distribute the W.R. Life stock to its
shareholders."' Several of the directors of the selling corporation
were to assume the same position with W.R. Life."' The sales
contract specifically stated that the contingent liabilities of the
seller were not to be assumed by the defendant. 1
The court began its analysis by stating the general rule that
there was no assumption of liaiblity by a successor corporation in
a purchase of assets transaction.' The court then listed five excep-
tions to that general rule, one of which would impose liability on
the successor where "the transaction is tantamount to a consolida-
tion or merger of the seller and purchaser. ' '1 .
The court stated that the four indices of a de facto merger '
set forth in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.' were indicative of
"the notion that no corporation should be permitted to commit a
tort and avoid liability through corporate transformations or
changes in form only.""' Of these four factors, "the most import-
ant in determining whether the transaction is a de facto merger
seems to be whether the sale of assets was paid for in cash or
shares of stock in the surviving corporation." ' If the sale was for
"ABC-400" insurance contracts of the American Business and Commercial
Life Insurance Company. The plaintiffs pleaded that the agents for the insur-
ance company had offered them an opportunity to invest in the insurance company
by purchasing the ABC-400 contracts. They alleged that the agents represented
to them that this investment would reap tremendous profits beyond the benefits
afforded by the life insurance which was a part of the contract. The opportunity
to purchase the ABC-400 contract supposedly was open for only a short time
and was available only to a limited number of investors. The appellees allegedly
were told that they were "founding" investors in the insurance company so that






217 Id. at 786.
218 ld.
21' See note 176 supra, and accompanying text.
21 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
" 553 S.W.2d at 786.
222 Id.
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stock, a de facto merger would usually result.'
Shortly after the de facto merger doctrine was judicially intro-
duced in Texas, the Texas legislature enacted a statute specifically
prohibiting the courts' use of the doctrine to create an exception
to the general rule of successor nonliability in a purchase of
assets transaction. In 1979, Article 5.10.B was added to the Texas
Business Corporation Act:'
A disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets
of a corporation requiring the special authorization of the share-
holders of the corporation under Section A of this article:
(1) is not considered to be a merger or consolidation pursuant
to this Act or otherwise; and
(2) except as otherwise expressly provided by another statute,
does not make the acquiring corporation responsible or liable
for any liability or obligation of the selling corporation that the
acquiring corporation did not expressly assume. 5
The Bar Committee comments which accompanied the statute
stated that the specific purpose of the amendment was "to pre-
clude the application of the doctrine of de facto merger in any
sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially
all the property and assets of a corporation requiring authoriza-
tion under Article 5.10.A."'' 6 The committee further declared
that "[t]he new statutory provision provides that the acquiring
corporation in a purchase of assets transaction does not assume
or otherwise become liable for liabilities of the corporation whose
assets are purchased, unless the acquiring corporation agrees con-
tractually to assume or become liable for such liabilities. '2
The Texas legislature intended to provide corporations with a
more stable basis to determine the extent of successor liability in
a purchase of assets transaction. By eliminating successor liability
based upon the de facto merger theory, the legislature has at-
tempted to absolve Texas law of the confusion over the doctrine's
applicability which inherently prevails whenever it is available.
The legislature was probably spurred in this effort by the incon-
Id. at 787.
ET.x. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10.B (Vernon Supp. 1979).
225 ld.
2 Id. at 400-01.
"227 d. at 401.
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sistencies and lack of agreement among other jurisdictions as to
the criteria which must be satisfied to find a de facto merger."
Indeed, even the Texas Court of Civil Appeals' attempt in Ger-
hardt' to introduce the de facto merger doctrine into the state
did not clearly define the circumstances under which a de facto
merger would be found.' ° Although the court listed four factors
characteristic of a de facto merger and even stressed the one fac-
tor it considered most important to the determination of the issue,
it gave no indication whether the presence of all four factors was
necessary or whether the presence of only the most important
factor (the receipt of stock instead of cash) would be sufficient
to constitute a de facto merger. Furthermore, even if Gerhardt
implicitly held that all four factors must be present for a de facto
merger to exist, there was no guidance as to the degree to which
they were required. Rather than submit corporations to the un-
answered questions raised in Gerhardt and to the mass confusion
which plagues holdings of other jurisdictions, the Texas legisla-
ture abolished the de factor merger doctrine completely."1
Although the legislature has abolished the de facto merger ex-
ception in Texas, the creditor or minority shareholder who sues
may recover under the bulk sales or fraudulent conveyances laws.
The Commentary of the Bar Committee on the statute states:
"[B]y expressly excepting from the operation of section B the effect
of 'any other statute of this State,' the statutory liabilities of an
acquiring corporation under the bulk sales or fraudulent convey-
ances laws or similar statutes are left intact.""' In sharp contrast,
the statute probably precludes the products liability plaintiff from
asserting a claim under a strict liability theory similar to that used
to impose liability on successor corporations in the Ray decision.
However, strong public policy considerations"' dictate that some
" See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 368 (3d Cir.
1974); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
2o 553 S.W.2d 783.
230 Id. at 786-87.
"'TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 5.10.B (Vernon Supp. 1979).
"' 1d. at 173. A discussion of the relationship of bulk sales and fraudulent
conveyance laws to the de facto merger doctrine is beyond the scope of this
comment. Bulk transfers are treated in the Uniform Commercial Code. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 6.101-6.111 (Bulk Transfers).
233 See note 150 supra, and accompanying text.
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method of recovery be available to these claimants. In contrast, it
appears that creditors, minority shareholders and products liability
claimants in Texas not onl,, will have no basis for recovery under
the de facto merger theory, they will also be unable to assert a
claim in a manner similar to the one asserted in Ray with its under-
lying public policy considerations.
The legislature has left open additional questions concerning the
applicability of other exceptions to the general rule of successor
nonliability. The sweeping language of Section 5.10.B(2) that
"the acquiring corporation [is not] responsible or liable for any
liability or obligation of the selling corporation that the acquiring
corporation did not expressly assume' 3" implies that other excep-
tions to the general rule, such as the continuity doctrine, also will
be unavailable in Texas. The bar committee comments state that
the amendment applies to the de facto merger exception but do
not specifically address the question of whether the use of other
exceptions ' is barred by Section 5.10.B. Although preliminary
indications lead to the conclusion that the recent amendment bars
the use of all exceptions to the general rule of successor nonlia-
bility in purchase of assets transactions, it remains to be seen
whether the Texas courts will interpret the sweeping language of
Section 5.10.B(2) to preclude use of the continuity exception and
these other exceptions.
V. IMPORTANCE OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY To THE
AVIATION INDUSTRY
The importance to the aviation industry of the question of what
liabilities are to be assumed by a successor corporation was demon-
strated in R.J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp.' The Enstrom
114TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.10.B (Vernon Supp. 1979).
By specifically stating that the amendment precludes the use of the de
facto merger doctrine in Texas, it could be argued that the Commentary of the
Bar Committee implied that the use of other exceptions, such as the continuity
exception, was not precluded by the amendment. Id. at 172. However, the
sweeping nature of the amendment greatly weakens such an argument. See
note 234 supra, and accompanying text. Later statements in the Commentary
of the Bar Committee seem to further negate this argument. See note 227 supra,
and accompanying text.
"R. J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1977)
(Oklahoma law). See generally Bouton v. Litton Industries, Inc., 423 F.2d 643
(3d Cir. 1970) (manufacturer of guidance and navigational systems).
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Corporation sued the Interceptor Corporation, the designer and
manufacturer of a single-engine turboprop airplane known as the
Interceptor 400, to recover for property damage sustained in the
crash of Enstrom's Interceptor 400 aircraft on January 15, 1972."'
Interceptor was organized in 1966, but by early in 1972 the cor-
poration was in serious financial trouble. In an attempt to save
the corporation, six of its major stockholders formed a limited
partnership in late 1972 and purchased an outstanding note of the
corporation. In October of 1974 all of the assets of the corpora-
tion were purchased by the limited partnership at a public sale.'
The limited partnership continued in business as a parts distributor,
but did not engage in the manufacture and sale of aircraft.
Enstrom sought to join the limited partnership as a defendant
in its suit against Interceptor. Enstrom argued that the limited
partnership was simply a continuation of Interceptor and that it
thus would fall under an exception to the general rule of non-
liability.' However, the court refused to hold that the limited
partnership was a mere continuation of the Interceptor Corpora-
tion.' The limited partnership was not a manufacturing company;
manufacturing was impossible as the partnership's warehouse was
unheated and without electricity; the partnership had no employees
who were certified by the FAA to build airplanes; its activities were
23 R. J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277, 279 (10th Cir.
1977).
2 A resolution was adopted at a special meeting of the shareholders of
Interceptor which provided that all of the corporation's assets were to be trans-
ferred to the limited partnership in return for cancellation of the note which
had been acquired by the limited partnership. One of the junior secured creditors
objected and compelled a sale of the assets as provided under . 9-504 and
9-505 of the U.C.C. In compliance with S 9-504, notice of the proposed public
sale was sent to Interceptor and Interceptor's secured creditors. The sale was
conducted but no bids were placed except for that of the limited partnership. Id.
at 280-81.
2
"In support of the continuation theory advanced by Enstrom, the plaintiff
argued that: (1) the limited partnership was a continuation of Interceptor
Corporation as the limited partnership's only assets were those it received from
Interceptor; (2) the active shareholders, directors and officers of Interceptor
Corporation were the same individuals who owned, controlled and managed
the limited partnership; (3) both the seller and purchaser employed the word
"Interceptor" in their business names, and; (4) one of the limited partnership's
business purposes, stated in the limited partnership agreement, was that of
manufacturing Interceptor airplanes, a purpose identical to that of Interceptor
Corporation. Id. at 282.
&40 Id.
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limited to selling spare aircraft parts, and it was not involved in
the production of the Interceptor 400.
Although R.J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp. involved the
continuity exception, the case demonstrates the potential import-
ance of the de facto merger exception to plaintiffs in cases involv-
ing claims against aviation-oriented corporations. If the assets of
the Interceptor Corporation had been purchased by a company in
exchange for its stock, and if the acquiring corporation had con-
tinued the business and operations of Interceptor, a strong argu-
ment could have been advanced by the Enstrom Corporation that
the transaction was a de facto merger. If that argument were suc-
cessful, the successor corporation would have been liable to En-
strom for the loss of the aircraft.
Such a hypothetical claim could result in the imposition of suc-
cessor liability under the "substance over form" theory 1 of Farris
v. Glen Alden Corp.' and Applestein v. United States Board &
Carton Corp.,"' depending upon the particular facts and circum-
stances of each case. Successor liability under the de facto merger
test set forth in Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co." and McKee
v. Harris-Seybold' would primarily depend upon whether there
was a sufficient continuity of interest by the selling corporation's
shareholders in the purchasing corporation, as well as upon whether
there had been an absorption of the corporate identity of the
seller by the purchaser.' The claim would clearly result in suc-
cessor liability under the expansive view of the de facto merger
doctrine ' represented by Knapp v. North American Rockwell
Corp.' and Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co."'
If the claim arose in Texas, the new statutory provision would
apparently preclude any possibility of recovery under any of the
'4 See notes 135-45 supra, and accompanying text.
"'393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
"'60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), afl'd, 33 N.J. 72,
161 A.2d 474 (1960).
244288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
21 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. 1970), a0f'd, 118 N.J. Super.
480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
" See notes 152-64 supra, and accompanying text.
347 See notes 165-79 supra, and accompanying text.
-8 506 F. 2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
"'379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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four generally recognized exceptions to the rule of successor non-
liability. This would be true regardless of whether the plaintiff was
a creditor, minority shareholder or products liability claimant."0
Under the holding in Ray v. Alad Corp." the only types of claim-
ants that would have a chance for successful recovery under the
de facto merger theory would be creditors or minority share-
holders. Even then liability would be imposed on the successor
corporation only where the consideration paid for the seller's
assets was inadequate or where the true indices of a merger were
present: the sale of assets in exchange for stock of the acquiring
corporation followed by the prompt distribution of that stock to
the seller's shareholders and the subsequent liquidation of the sell-
ing corporation. Products liability plaintiffs such as the Enstrom
Corporation thus would be forced to bring a claim under strict
tort liability rather than under the de facto merger doctrine. Due
to the public policy considerations underlying product liability
claims, this type of plaintiff would have a better chance of re-
covery in California than would creditors and mifiority stock-
holders who are limited to the strict de facto merger test set forth
in Ray.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to favorable economic conditions, the number of corporate
mergers and consolidations has increased in recent years. To avoid
the successor liability that generally follows a merger, corpora-
tions have attempted to structure acquisitions to appear to be
simple sales of assets. Initially, the courts sought to hold the sell-
ing corporation or its shareholders liable under the "trust fund"
theory. However, the status of that theory's, continued applicability,
due to the postponed abatement statutes now in effect in all juris-
dictions, is presently unclear.
With the passage of time after a transaction, the selling corpora-
tion often dissolves, and its shareholders disperse or squander the
proceeds they receive from the liquidation. When the courts be-
came aware that plaintiffs often had been unable to recover from
50 The creditor or minority shareholder might be protected by the bulk
sales of fraudulent conveyances laws. See note 232 supra, and accompanying text.
"1 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
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the selling corporations, their emphasis shifted from holding the
sellers or their former shareholders liable to providing the plain-
tiffs with an action against the purchasers. To effectuate this pur-
pose, four exceptions to the general rule of sucessor nonliability
were created. Most notable among these four was the de facto
merger exception.
In creating these exceptions, the courts have not been able to
agree upon the definitive criteria necessary for their application.
This inconsistency exists whether the plaintiff is a creditor or a mi-
nority shareholder of the selling corporation. The court decisions
become even more confusing when the plaintiff's claim is brought
under strict products liability theory. The underlying public policy
consideration of this theory, spreading the cost of injuries through-
out society," has caused many jurisdictions to expand the de facto
merger exception beyond the framework of corporate law which
the doctrine originally occupied.
To date, there has been very little backlash to the attempts to
expand the de facto merger exception. However, one jurisdiction
has disregarded the lead of others which have been expanding the
exception. The California Supreme Court recently refused to ex-
pand the doctrine beyond its original corporate law boundaries.
However, in doing so, the court imposed strict tort liability on
the successor corporation for products liability claims, creating a
fifth exception in addition to those already recognized. Mean-
while, in Texas, the legislature abolished the use of the de facto
merger exception after a state court adopted an expansive version
of the doctrine. It is currently unclear whether that statute also
forbids the use of the additional exceptions recognized by other
jurisdictions' to allow recovery from the purchasing corporation.
The California judicial solution appears more equitable than
the Texas legislative solution. In an apparent attempt to dispel
the confusion over the scope of the de facto merger doctrine's
applicability, the Texas legislature has gone too far in totally
abolishing the doctrine. In essence, the Texas approach limits the
potential recovery of creditors and minority shareholders from the
successor corporation to that prescribed by the local bulk sales or
" For a discussion' of other public policy considerations in the law of strict
tort products liability, see note 150 supra, and accompanying text.
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fradulent conveyances acts or the "trust fund" doctrine,' and
completely precludes any recovery by products liability claimants.
The availability of the de facto marger doctrine has proved to be
valuable to creditors and minority shareholders in other jurisdic-
tions."4 As the Gerhardt case demonstrated, the doctrine could be
equally valuable to such plaintiffs in Texas if its use was allowed
by the legislature. However, even if the de facto merger doctrine
is limited in scope as was originally intended, some method of
recovery must be made available to products liability plaintiffs.
Jurisdictions contemplating abolishing the de facto merger ex-
ception in a manner similar to that undertaken by Texas should
first examine the California solution. By limiting the applicability
of the doctrine, California has reduced the confusion that often
results when the doctrine is expanded because of public policy
considerations, while it still allows recovery by creditors or dis-
senting minority shareholders so long as the true indices of a
merger are present. To provide the products liability claimant
with a means of recovering from the successor corporation, Cali-
fornia has expanded strict tort liability concepts to impose lia-
bility on the successor regardless of the presence or absence of
the indices of a merger. This approach should be followed by
other jurisdictions as it provides an opportunity for recovery by
creditors and dissenting minority shareholders upon their meeting
the strict test of the corporate based de facto merger theory, and
a more liberal opportunity for recovery by products liability plain-
tiffs under the theory of strict products liability with its inherent
public policy considerations.
25 See TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10.B, Comment of The Bar Com-
mittee at 173 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
1 4 See Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159
A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960); Farris
v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
